**CBUAE Classification: Restricted** 









## STR Outreach & Awareness – All Banks & Finance Companies

10 March 2021



<u>Item</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Presenter</u>	Slide #	<u>Time</u>
1.	Introduction	FIU team	-	10 min
2.	Overview of matters related to STRs by the FIU (Financial Intelligence Unit)	FIU team	3	30 min
3.	Overview of AML/CFT and STR by the CBUAE	CBUAE AML/CFT supervision	18	30 min
4.	Cases related to ML & Recommendations by the MOI (Ministry of Interior)	MOI team	31	15 min
5.	Open Questions & Remarks	All attendees	36	20 min



# Overview of matters related to STRs by the FIU (Financial Intelligence Unit)

Presented by: FIU team

10 March 2021



# **Banks and Finance Houses**

Introduction to Financial Intelligence Unit

10 March 2021 uaefiu.gov.ae

# **Brief Introduction of FIU**

- Establishment and Mandate of the FIU
- Structure of FIU
- Core Functions of the FIU





## When to Report

- Article 15 Federal Decree-law No. (20) of 2018 ON ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND FINANCING OF ILLEGAL ORGANISATIONS
- Article 17 Cabinet Decision No. (10) of 2019 CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTING REGULATION OF DECREE LAW NO. (20) OF 2018 ON ANTI- MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND ILLEGAL ORGANISATIONS






## What to Report

As per article (15) Federal Decree-law No. (20) of 2018 On AML/CFT, all FIs and DNFBPs must file SAR/STR upon having reasonable grounds to SUSPECT a transaction or funds representing all or some proceeds, or suspicion of their relationship to the CRIME or that they will be used regardless of their value.

#### Sources of illicit funds:

- Fraud, Corruption, Arm Trafficking, Drug trafficking, Human trafficking, Smuggling. Etc.
- Suspicion of financing a terrorist act/supporting terrorist organization
- Besides transaction(s), suspicion may arise by virtue of activities which are out of line of customer's profile or unusual behavior or information available which suggests negative background of the customer/client such as adverse media, inclusion in sanctions or Persona Non Grata





## **How to Report**

- goAML THE ONLY CHANNEL
- Commensurate Report Type(s)
  - STR
  - SAR
  - AIF/AIFT
  - RFI/RFIT






## **Compliance Officer Tasks**



## Internal Procedures while filing

- Timeline of filing
- Data Backup for records
- Validly of drafts
- Acceptance/Rejection
- Prioritization/Recall
- Amendment of data
- Correspondence with FIU
  - goAML Message Board
  - FIUSTR@uaefiu.gov.ae







# Actions to be taken by FIs with respect to an account on which an STR/SAR is filed


Securing the funds

Internal Policies, terms & Conditions






# How to deal with the client enquiries/orders post filing of STR






# Best Practices for identification and submission of STRs/SARs to FIU



## Feedback on STRs/SARs received





# Type of deficiencies noted by the FIU

- Timeliness
- Accuracy of:
  - Data input in goAML fields
  - The relevant RFR(s)
  - Attachments along with reports





# How to register on goAML

- Web pre-registration Guide
- Web registration Guide
- Web Submission Guide







# Thank You

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## Overview of AML/CFT and STR by the CBUAE

Presented by: AML/CFT team

10 March 2021

### AML LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDANCE


Under the Procedures for Anti Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism and Illicit Organizations, the below Articles include:

#### Article (2)


Financial Institution and its concerned persons must comply with the requirements mentioned in the Decree Federal Law , The Executive Regulation, instructions, guidelines and notices issued by the Central Bank relating to implementation of the Decree Federal Law and the Executive Regulation.

#### Article (3)

The Central Bank shall supervise and examine periodically or unexpectedly, without prior notice to the Financial Institution's compliance with the Decree Federal Law, The Executive Regulation, instructions, guidelines and notices issued by the Central Bank and shall identify any violations resulting from the examination.







3

All documents regarding the Anti money laundering Legislation from the year 1987 & onwards



Procedures for Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism and Illicit Organizations Anti-Money
Laundering and
Combating the
Financing of
Terrorism and Illegal
Organisations

2

Guidelines for Financial Institutions Registered Hawala Providers Regulation Cabinet Decision
No. (10) of 2019Concerning the
implementing
regulation of decree
law no. (20) of 2018
on anti-money
laundering and
combating the
financing of
terrorism and illegal
organisations

Federal Decree-law
No. (20) of 2018 on
Anti-money
Laundering and
Combating the
Financing Of
Terrorism And
Financing Of Illegal
Organisations

5



Recommendation 20
Reporting of Suspicious Transactions

If a financial institution suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that:

- funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity, or
- are related to terrorist financing,

it should be required, by law, to report promptly its suspicions to the financial intelligence unit (FIU)".



The reporting of suspicious and unusual transactions and activities is regarded as an essential element of the anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism regime for every country

### USING SOURCE OF FUNDS OR WEALTH INFORMATION

- 1 Where does he or she work?
  - 2 What sector or industry are they employed in/ run business in
  - Can you expect cross border flows of money. If so, which countries & currencies
  - Is this the only means of income. What about other business activities
  - How much income/ turnover will flow through the account monthly
    - Is there any anticipated ad-hoc sums of money, e.g. bonuses or dividends

- It is critical to obtain meaningful, comprehensive & accurate source of funds / wealth information about a client
- This information should be kept up to date at reasonable interactions with clients/ on a defined periodic basis
- This will help in STR alert investigation to make sense of suspicious activity



## MONITORING TRIGGERS & ALERTS IN THE BANKING SECTOR (1/3)

#### **RETAIL**

- Value
- Volume
- Turnover
- Mules
- Smurfs
- Cash
- Stupid, illogical questions
- Rich children
- Too many zeros

#### **CORPORATE**

- Offshore payments
- Back to back loans
- Cash
- Too much too soon
- Consultancy
- Too many zeros
- Too many payers
- Source Of Wealth
- Source Of Funds
- Illogical
- inconsistent activity/business

#### PRIVATE BANKING/ ASSET MANAGEMENT

- Tax planning dance avoidance evasion
- Offshore vs onshore
- Back-to-back loans
- Corporate funds redirected
- Nominees used
- Consultancy payments
   Unusual requests
- Too many zeros
- Multiple transactions
- to/ from same
- party



### MONITORING TRIGGERS & ALERTS IN THE BANKING SECTOR (2/3)

## CORRESPONDENT BANKING

- Concentration of transactions with a small number of parties
- Constantly missing customer information
- Constant round figure activity
- Multiple payment to/receipts from the same parties on the same day
- Illogical currency/ geographical activity
- Products & services outside of key business
- Payments to high risk jurisdictions

#### **EQUITIES**

- Backdated share options
- Churning
- Insider dealing
- Front-running
- Market manipulation

# INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS

- Multi-national payments & receipts
- High value, high volume
- Rapid in & out movements of the same value
- Payments to far removed/ unrelated third parties
- No public profile against high value/volume
- Multiple round figure payments same parties
- Illogical activity
- Payments within
- complex structures



## MONITORING TRIGGERS & ALERTS IN THE BANKING SECTOR (3/3)

# POLITICIANS (PEPs/PIPs)

- Cash movements
- Deposits from 3<sup>rd</sup> parties
- Overseas transactions
- Round figures
- High values
- Undisclosed/inconsistent with role
- From corporations with government contracts
- Expense reimbursements

#### **CORRUPTION**

- Natural resources/ mining, wildlife
- Persons of Influence
- (cash for questions)
- Cash
- Third Parties
- Corporate entities with government contracts



## MODES OF PAYMENT & ASSOCIATED RISKS

- A refusal to use safer alternative products & services
- Self-handling of high value (no use of a security company)
- No audit trail
- Illogical given nature of business
- Volumes or value seem too high
- Used too often
- Used notes
- High value denomination notes

**CASH** 



- Three legs or more
- In and out
- High value
- Round figures
- Repeat activity/multiple wires to/from the same party
- Smurfing
- Missing information
- Close to sanction countries
- Offshore and UK companies/partnerships

**ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS** 







#### CENTRAL BANK OF THE U.A.E.

#### **METHODS OF MONITORING**

Manual Monitoring Processes


- Considered when volumes are low
- Dependent on thorough ongoing training & awareness
- Requires appropriate quality assurance
- Not suitable for growing businesses
- Not ideal for complex environments
- Although economical, resources & potential work may become expensive

Automated Monitoring Processes

- Expensive & complex to implement
- Ensures consistency in monitoring logic
- Reduces human dependency and room for error
- Customizable commensurate with evolving business risks
- Requires rigorous governance & control
- Should be business-wide otherwise ineffective



#### **TYPOLOGIES IN STRs**



#### A typical AML/CFT Program includes:

- Procedures for the identification of suspicious or unusual transactions and/or activity using information derived from TMS alerts, customer KYCs, etc.
- Documented assessments & investigations of STR instances
- Periodic reporting of STR filings to Senior Management and/or Board of Directors (BoD)
- Adequate & ongoing AML/CFT training programmes for personnel



#### KEY ISSUES ARISING FROM THE FINANCIAL INSTUTITON SECTOR



- Deficiencies with Customer Segmentation
- Deficiencies or inadequacies with typology assessments
- Deficiencies in the TMS alert workflow, including:
  - Lack of or poor training
  - Poor guidelines and procedures for alerts clearing (some of which did not define SLAs and investigation timeframes)
  - Lack of an automated **risk scoring model** for the prioritization of alerts

- Weak controls (including for mapping across TMS) to detect money laundering & terrorism financing activities
- Insufficient product coverage and scenario tuning in TMS
- KYC data quality & completeness issues which impacted the quality of TMS output



- Inadequate or poor AML/CFT training
- Weaknesses in Policies & Procedures
- Defensive STR reporting
- Multiple profiles for the same customer impacting quality of TMS output, as well as detection and reporting of STRs to the FIU
- Manual identification of unusual/suspicious transactions for certain activities

- Delays in alerts closure and/or reporting STRs
- Hibernation strategy (hibernation low/medium risk cases)
  adopted post backlog issues leading to potentially
  unreported unusual/suspicious activity
- Lack of clear justifications and articulation of investigations to address the underlying STs



#### **End of Presentation**

Thank you



# Cases related to ML & Recommendations by the MOI (Ministry of Interior)

Presented by: MOI team

10 March 2021

### **The Ministry of Interior (MOI)**

## 2020 Statistics

- 264 Accounts involved in narcotics trafficking or money laundering or both crimes.
- 128 natural or legal persons.

#### **The Ministry of Interior (MOI)**

## Red Flags

- Credit Turnover not in line with customer profile.
- Deposit times through CDM & internal transfers.
- Amounts repetition.

### **The Ministry of Interior (MOI)**

## Recommendations

- Intensification of monitoring.
- Design a system which serves the discovery process.



#### **End of Presentation**

Thank you

